Richard North is asking the Wrong Question.
I don't often post about matters military, because for me it is very close to home. But I've been reading Richard North's "Defence of the realm" blog for a while and there is no doubt it raises important questions.
Let's leave aside for the moment the fact that North is obnoxious on a heroic scale (which is why I neither read or link to his 'EU referendum'), and thinks everyone else is not just wrong, but wrong AND in the pay of the defence industrial complex. Boor though he is, there are areas where I agree: the dearth of mine-protected vehicles in Afghanistan is a scandal, the failures of procurement which led to the shortage of choppers is nothing short of criminal, Bob Ainsworth is a useless git, the MoD is a bunch of cunts and so on.
But he is rather too keen on criticising the Army command for decisions taken in an operational context, of which no blogger can know the details. In a recent post he says
"Then, on 6 June, an EFP "daisy chain" is discovered intact and successfully defused. It is taken away for forensic analysis, from which the Army confirms with no room for doubt that Snatch Land Rovers offer no protection at all to this type of device.
So what does the Army do? On 15 July it sends another Snatch patrol out into the same general area where the device is known to be used. Three soldiers are killed and two more injured. And then the Army does it again and again and again.
We are led to believe that the Army is manned by professionals – soldiers who know what they are doing. We can criticise the politicians freely, but not our "Brave Boys" who put their lives on the line.
So which politician was it that decided to send a foot patrol out into an environment where twice previously soldiers had encountered complex, multiple IED ambushes and experienced multiple casualties?"
Of course a snatch doesn't provide protection from an EFP (of which few are in Afghanistan... here he's talking about Iraq). A Main Battle Tank is vulnerable to these devices. So suggesting that a vehicle vulnerable to 7.76mm is at risk from EFPs and presenting it as an observation, is dishonest to say the least.
Blaming operational commanders for sending boys "
into the same general area" for their deaths is bordering on the slanderous. Does he know what the "Brave boys" were there to do, because reading North's blog, you feel that he thinks commanders send their soldiers to act as target practice for Terry Taleban or Jonny Jihadi. If they're being sent into danger, it is because there is a job to do, which the commanders deem worth the risk. It would be nice if there were enough of the right vehicles to do the job, but in Iraq in 2005, snatches were all that was available.
Let's ignore the EFP for a minute. They aren't found in Afghanistan in any number. It's low Explosive, mostly made with fertiliser given by aid agencies, not a million miles away from the 'culvert bomb' familiar from the Northern Ireland campaign. In Afghanistan, the Taleban have long ceased to assault western forces - to go toe-to-toe with us, as they often did with the Russians, because to assault a position manned by Western forces is nothing short of suicide. Instead, they have learned the tactics of the Ambush - bomb, follow up with booby traps in cover, and rush in and shoot up anyone who's left.
The Taleban are good at this, and in the words of one soldier in my acquaintance, you have to be "a right ninja" to get out of a well laid Taleban ambush alive. In the excerpt above, North seems to be suggesting that British forces should not be sent somewhere where bombs are to be found, or have been found. Well given the sparse road network in Afghanistan, that's impossible. Eventually you'll drive over a device or into an ambush. Confining forces to base is not an option.
The NATO forces in both theatres rely not on armour to survive blasts, though that helps, but in what Soldiers now call TTPs. Tactics, Techniques and Procedures. It is these that must evolve, and do. We must get better at spotting devices before they go off. Because there are few vehicles which can survive the many hundred lb devices being deployed. Above all we must prevent the devices being laid, and just as in Iraq, that's about intelligence, and identifying the bomb-makers and interdicting supply of the most hard-to-get part, not about riding in ever more effective armour.
He seems to suggest that no road move should be in vehicles without boat-shaped hulls, which is just not practical. Yes. Vehicle procurement could and should have been better, but that is not why we're going to lose, and repetitive "I told you so" from North isn't going to save a single life.
It's not about kit. If we're going to lose, we are going to lose because of the decisions made at the political level. The army is going to have to deal with the tactics themselves. That is what they are paid to do.
The first principle of war is "selection and maintenance of the Aim". That is where we've gone wrong. The fucking Americans with their "war on drugs", the NGOs and development wallahs are paying bribes to the Taleban and the sheer corruption of the Karzai government all get in the way of the Clauswitzian victory necessary to allow an alternative to drugs for poor farmers and allow roads 'n schools to be built. We must degrade the Taleban's ability and willingness to fight BEFORE we can do anything else.
While the Taleban can set up ambushes involving multiple devices and many hundreds of lbs of explosive at will, then anything other than defeating them is going to be counter productive.
The fact is soldiers are there to do a job, and that job entails risk. If you mount a big, fuck-off offensive (what, like the one just done?), especially one which coincides with another in Pakistan, (what, like the one they just done?) then you're going to have to move men, materiel about more often. There will be more bullets flying and more men will die.
Incidentally, it was on 10 March 2007 that Anthony Loyd, soldier turned photographer and war correspondent, argued: "for once" an Afghan war is winnable, declaring that, "the tide is turning against the Taleban".
Some tide ... some Taleban.
This is defeatism. For all his forensic knowledge of military vehichles, North's is the knowledge of a
Walt. The Taleban are fighting for their lives. Their commanders are at risk in Afghanistan, and increasingly in their bases in Pakistan. They do not have the manpower to launch an all out assault like they did in 2007. Nor do they have sufficiently educated footsoldiers to lay the most sophisticated devices - the EFPs he insinuated were in Afghanistan.
This is not to deny the Taleban are causing huge problems, but I don't think anyone underestimated how dangerous they are. The fact is North is ticking each death off, and using it to confirm an already-held opinion: That the Army should listen to him, because he knows everything. This monstrous ego is blinding him to the bigger picture: Afghanistan, like Iraq is winnable, but needs political support at home for this to be achieved (I am not suggesting that to Criticise the Army is unpatriotic). Like Iraq, soldiers will not be invulnerable, and will die both on the battlefield and on the road, and to use each death as a political football is offensive. Whether or not they are in decent vehicles, or helicopters, soldiers on operations get killed. The recent deaths around Sangin may be because of panthers claw, or despite it but, the current intensity of the fighting, like in the surge in Iraq of 2007, presaged a defeat of our opponents, not unless North and the Ignorant MSM get their way, a presage of defeat. No doubt soldiers on the Ground are modifying TTPs as we speak to deal with the relatively new Taleban tactics.
Unlike Iraq, the British Government is fully committed to the surge, and the British Army is taking a full part alongside our NATO allies.
In savaging the dead-tree press for fixating on the round-number of 200 deaths, he appears to be unaware that he's doing exactly the same. Coalition deaths, though terrible are inevitable if we're to achieve objective one. Was June 6th 1944 the greatest disaster of WWII? No. But it was the costliest in American, British and Canadian, lives. This is a price these nations deemed worth the result - the opening of a second front and the speedy demise of Hitler.
To talk about operations like Afghanistan, like Iraq and the Former Yugoslavia before it, as having a point when you can say "we won" is rubbish, and demonstrates you don't understand modern, low intensity war. These wars do not have victories, they have cost-benefit analyses. When the nation you're building is sufficiently unshit for it to be left to the natives to finish off, you leave. As I said about Iraq, In Afghanistan, we're
playing for the point. There is no victory, and the absence of defeat is a simple matter of political will.
Richard North and others in calling the War "unwinnable" are way off the mark.